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In 1976, the Parisian publisher Dunod brought out
two collections of economic articles, one entitled
Fluctuation in a Prosperous Economy and the other
Rupture of an Economic System. History has
unfortunately vindicated the latter. Since average
rates of growth have remained fairly high, it is not
absurd to view the crisis as a succession of contingent
shocks in a progressive evolution, shocks which have
ultimately been absorbed. This interpretation, how-
ever, ignores the intolerable growth of poverty not
only in the Third World but also in the most
prosperous metropoles; the immensity of the
mutations that have been occurring; and above all, the
progressive spread of uncertainty about the future,, in
contrast to the expectations of the glorious post-war
years. 'The old is dying; the new has not yet been able
to be born': Gramsci's formulation aptly grasps the
essence of the crisis. This article seeks to sketch this
painful gestation process, in the light of some recent
studies that are sometimes designated the 'French
school of regulation'.1
Our point of departure will be to describe the basis of
the 'Fordist' model of development, including its
international aspects. The second section will analyse
the system's entry into crisis, from 1967 to 1974. The
third section will present a transitional regime which
schematically links the two oil shocks, characterised
by a 'Keynesian management' of the crisis in the
developed countries, and the take-off of 'peripheral
Fordism'. After measuring the damage done by the
'monetarist shock', the conclusion will underline the
scale of problems to be resolved before one could
speak of 'emerging from the crisis'.
The 'French school of regulation' has developed around the
concepts of the 'regime of accumulation' and the 'mode of
regulation'. The regime of accumulation is a systematic mode of
dividing and reallocating the social product, which achieves over a
period a certain match between the transformation of the conditions
of production and final consumption. The mode of regulation is
defined as the ensemble of institutional forms, networks and norms
which assure the compatibility of behaviours in the framework of a
regime of accumulation.
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A Well-Regulated Regime of Accumulation:
Fordism
To understand that the crisis cannot be reduced to
some shocks caused by the carelessness of rulers
(monetary laxity) or the sudden greed of some of the
groups sharing the total world product (OPEC, or
trade unions) we have to understand how 'the old
which is dying' used to work in its heyday, the epoch
which President Johnson dubbed 'the US summer'.
The 'Fordist' model of accumulation grew out of a
revolutionary change in the organisation of work
generalised in the USA, (and partially in Europe) in
the l920s, i.e. Taylorism. Taylorism meant a
deepening of capitalist control of the labour process
through 'scientific management'. 'Fordism' repre-
sented in the first place, a watershed in this
development, which was reached by incorporating the
know-how of the collective worker into an automatic
system of machinery, which dictated work methods
[Coriat 1979]. In the inter-war years, the development
of Taylorism and embryonic Fordism stimulated the
first big wave of intensive accumulation.2 But
although productivity grew at the rate of six per cent
per year, the growth of purchasing power remained
limited. This scissors effect, which raised the rate of
profit by raising the rate of exploitation, was not offset
by a growth in capital intensity, and it provoked an
unprecendented crisis. The crisis of the l930s was
more than a 'low point' in the business cycle. What it
demonstrated was that the competitive mode of
regulation - i.e. in particular, the system of setting
wage-levels by individual or plant-level bargaining -
was no longer adequate to sustain intensive
accumulation. We can therefore characterise this crisis
as both the first crisis of intensive accumulation and
the last crisis of competitive regulation.
After the post-war reconstruction of Europe and the
Korean war, the OECD countries underwent a new
2 In this conceptualisation, there appear several typical regimes of
accumulation, extensive and intensive, depending on the type of
reproduction scheme employed in the allocation of capital between
capital and consumption goods.
intensive expansion for 20 years during which
productivity again increased considerably, as did fixed
capital per head. But this time, the increase in the
purchasing power of wage-earners (productive and
unproductive) paralleled almost exactly the rise in
productivity. In this 'golden age' of Fordism, two new
conditions obtained in the developed countries up to
the middle of the 1960s. Firstly, capital intensity grew
at approximately the same rate as productivity in the
production goods sector. This inhibited the tendency
for capital intensity to increase. Secondly, the rates of
growth of consumption of wage earners and of the
productivity of the consumption goods sector were the
same. Thus both the counter-tendencies to expansion,
a falling rate of profit and under-consumption, were
inhibited, and accumulation could therefore follow a
regular rhythm.
This was assured by a mode of regulation,
consolidated after 1945, which combined several
institutional forms: a 'collective contractualisation' of
the direct wage by national wage agreements and
social security systems which established a guaranteed
minimum wage, social security and unemployment
insurance; important modifications in the relation
between banks and industrial firms; and, most
importantly, a modification in the role of the state.
Through wage and currency management, and the
control of state spending and receipts, the state was
able to cut taxes and increase spending when business
slackened. Each country experimented with and
developed Fordism for its own purposes by increasing
its internal market through an increase of purchasing
power. The Fordist model of growth gives only
secondary importance to international trade: the ratio
of exports to internal markets in manufactured goods
reached its lowest historical point towards 1965.
Tendentially, the South was limited to the role of
provider of manpower and raw materials, sources
controlled essentially by the political and military
hegemony of the USA. Internal trade developed at this
time mainly within the northern continental blocs and
within the OECD. These 'North-North' economic
relations consisted essentially of a vast 'catching up'
movement by Europe and Japan in relation to the
USA. This process of differentiation/catching up
constituted a regime of accumulation and a form of
regulation. With a considerable lead in industrial
productivity and manufactured value-added, the USA
imposed its model of development, first culturally,
then financially and institutionally.
At this time there was a temporary compatibility
between a number of similar accumulation regimes,
differentiated by their rates of growth and their modes
of international insertion. The world economy would,
however, never surpass this level of implicit
organisation. There would never be institutional
forms regulating world demand, nor any supranational
sovereign authority regulating the money supply. The
complementarities of the various national economies
would remain partial and unstable, rendering any
reference to a 'world regime of accumulation' a mere
figure of speech.
From Slow Erosion to Manifest Crisis
(1967-74)
If one characterises the crisis by the general slowing
down of the growth of manufacturing production,
causing a general and continuous rise in unemploy-
ment, and by a loss of regular growth, then one must
perceive its clearest symptoms as early as the recession
of 1967, affecting the most typically Fordist branches,
such as automobile production [Boyer 1979]. This
general crisis of manufacturing productivity must first
be examined in the context of national regimes of
accumulation, followed by a consideration of the
amplifying effect of the interaction of these regimes.
The most convincing explanation of this phenomenon
is the decline in the profitability of capital. As early as
the middle 1960s, decreasing productivity gains
necessitated an increase in the value of capital per
head. But at this point, productivity gains no longer
compensated for the increased volume of fixed capital
per head. The 'mark-up' procedures characteristic of
monopolistic regulation initially compensated for this
by a nominal rise in profits which, however, provoked
a general increase in prices and wages, and then an
increase in the share of depreciation in the gross
margin of reinvestment. Thus, rising corporate
indebtedness and increased financial costs led to a
crisis of investment capability in an inflationary
environment.
Thus, in contrast to the overproduction crisis of 1930,
the present crisis of intensive accumulation appears as
a crisis of profitability. The institutional forms of
monopolist regulation limit the 'depression spiral':
increases in the indirect wage reduce the decrease in
total purchasing power (in spite of the growth of
unemploythent), and the strength of the credit system
permits the survival of firms which would have been
reduced to bankruptcy under the gold standard
banking system. The crisis thus assumes the form of a
stagnation, not of a collapse of production, and
coexists with inflation, not a collapse of prices.
The productivity slowdown cannot be identified with
a lag in technological innovation, but can be more
clearly explained by the failures of the Taylorist and
Fordist principles of labour organisation. There is
reason to believe that after 50 years this method of
discipline and extraction of know-how has reached its
limits (exemplified, for instance, by loss of time
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between operations, and delays concentrated at the
end of the production line). It is here that we
rediscover the class struggle, at the root of the slowing
down of productivity: the great victory of the
employers during the I 920s had dissipated its own
bounty. The years 1967-74 were the years of a workers'
counter-offensive, superimposed on the employers'
immobile 'social technology'. It remains to be
understood, however, how this 'latent crisis' of
Fordism - accumulating but not yet overwhelming
- could degenerate into manifest recession. For this,
both the international dimension, and governmental
and employer reactions must be taken into account.
The growth of multinational firms in Europe and the
generalisation of Fordist methods in Europe and
Japan qualitatively and radically modified the
international configuration from 1967 onwards: the
level of productivity in Japan and Europe (particularly
West Germany and France) converged on that of the
USA to the point where wage cost per unit produced
became higher in the USA. From this point onward,
the US trade balance was in deficit. 'Xeno-
dollars'could no longer be considered as representing
a 'currency-commodity' (gold), or values-in-process
(productive capital) indisputably validated at the
international level, given the USA's declining
competitiveness. The dollar started to float downward
against all currencies as American capital lost its
capacity for foreign investment. A trade war was
launched between the three more or less equally
competitive poles of the world economy. In this new
'tri-polar' configuration the phases of economic
expansion and recession tended directly to echo and
amplify each other.
The 1973 boom produced an extreme tension on the
raw material markets and struck at US hegemony in
the aftermath of the Indochina defeat. Meanwhile the
Arab-Israeli war had given the oil-exporting countries
the opportunity to recover control of the fixing of oil
rents. Theoretically, this constituted only a shift in the
ownership of a minimal share of world value-added.
But in the developed countries, already menaced by
recession, and where the latent crisis of Fordism was
exacerbating tensions over the share-out of this value-
added, this sudden deduction immediately provoked
an inflationary flare-up. On the pretext of rising
inflation, employers and governments attempted, by
squeezing wages and restricting credit, to impose a
decrease in the purchasing power of wage-earners. The
first result obtained in this direction during 1974
produced a depression of world demand which, added
to a catastrophic reduction of inventories, brought on
the first great recession of the crisis.
From 1975 however, worker and union resistance
everywhere choked off this first austerity offensive. In
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particular, the automatic stabilisers of the welfare
state prevented a depressive spiral, guaranteeing the
stability of consumption in spite of the growth of
unemployment [Boyer 1982]. By 1975, there was a
general recovery assisted by the fact that the oil
deduction, financed by credit, actually multiplied
effective world demand.
A Transitional Configuration: 1975-79
The first phase of the management of the crisis can be
termed social-democratic. Among Germany and
Scandinavia's social democrats, Britain's Labour
Party, the US democrats and France's centrist
goverñment, the dominant idea was that Keynesianism
remained valid. It was only necessary, by borrowing or
by expanding world credit, to wait out the adjustment
of supply to the shift of the world demand structure
towards the capital goods and military equipment
ordered by the OPEC countries.
At the national level, this policy was practised in a
particularly effective manner by the Carter admini-
stration. At the cost of a discretionary currency
increase, the US supplied the world with a credit
currency whose validity was universally accepted,
even though its international purchasing power was
increasingly in question. This monetary laxity
favoured domestic expansion in the USA, producing
only moderate inflation because of a low import
coefficient. The nominal decrease in the dollar's value
relative to other currencies translated into a real
devaluation of American costs, re-establishing the
competitiveness too long compromised by over-
valuation. Japan, too, successfully followed this
policy, flooding the world market with Fordist-type
manufactured products. But only these two poles were
successful in this 'Keynesianism + devaluation' tactic,
setting their industrial growth apart from that of
Europe, the home of a different variant of Fordism.
There, an obstacle blocked the implementation of the
US/Japanese strategy: the perverse mechanics of
'austerity + internationalisation'.
Although more and more integrated and comple-
mentary at the industrial level, Europe remained
fragmented into distinct nations, each of which had to
watch its trade balance. In these conditions,
devaluation loses much of its effectiveness since 'price-
effects' have little impact, creating instead only
reciprocal trade deficits. These deficits could only be
redressed by imposing a strong form of protectionism:
restrictions on wages austerity - 'competitive
stagnation'. The different European countries thus
found themselves, relative to one another, in a
situation of 'competitive regulation', which quickly
compromised the effectiveness of internal Key-
nesianism. Although this stagnation configuration
would soon become generalised, for the moment it
enjoyed a more favourable environment, a 'world
Keynesianism', whose most spectacular manifestion
was the growth of peripheral Fordism.
The Fordism adopted by several newly industrialising
countries (NICs) in the 1970s was only fully
implemented at the level of the immediate labour
process, and in a much more partial way at the level of
the wage relation (i.e. Fordist consumption norms
were rarely instituted). In such conditions, 'effective
demand', the markets, can only be international. The
NICs import the north's capital goods and sell it
manufactured goods. Specifically, the OECD coun-
tries, plagued by low productivity gains and lagging
investments, financed the NICs' imports on credit,
thus permitting the expansion of an international
credit currency (Xeno-dollars) based on the American
credit currency. Through loans by the banks of the
surplus countries, the NICs purchased capital goods
on credit from the OECD, to be reimbursed by their
sales of manufactured goods back to the northern and
OPEC countries. Because of their low wage costs, high
productivity and a world market expanding through
the social democratic management of the crisis, it was
reasonable for the NICs to assume that this was a
viable option. In its embryonic stages, the strategy
seemed to encounter miraculous conditions of
implementation: the NICs achieved high growth rates,
while their demand for northern capital goods more
than compensated for the loss of jobs in the old
industrial countries which was resulting from
productivity gains in the consumer goods sector. The
recycling towards the NICs of the 'monetization' of
the American deficit caused by increased oil prices
played, in a sense, the role of a 'forced Marshall plan'
for the Third World, a mirror image of the beneficent
US-Europe-Japan configuration of the 1950s.
One must insist, however, on the extreme brittleness of
this private recycling, and of the periphery Fordist
model itself. Extremely dependent on the evolution of
world demand, it affects only a very limited number of
countries of the South, while destabilising their
internal structures. Under the weight of its contra-
dictions, it collapsed by the end of the decade in
Nigeria, Turkey, Iran, etc. In the north, because of the
welfare state and Keynesian policies Fordism enjoyed
a credit-based continuity. The crisis manifested itself
there in the contrast between an 'abnormally' slow
growth rate and increasingly rapid inflation: 'stag-
flation'. To maintain consumption in the face of
slowed productivity growth and a shrinking industrial
workforce, the costs of the welfare state had to be
largely supported by firms, a burden reflected in
plummeting profit shares. This, combined with the
rise in the cost of fixed capital, forced capitalism to
explore new arrangements for climbing out of the
crisis.
Peripheral Fordism was one way, but more
fundamentally, two great changes took shape in the
wage relation. The first, a regressive change, consists
in an undermining of the conditions of labour power
production upheld by the permanent income ensured
by the welfare state. Firms attempted to free
themselves from their heavy contractual obligations to
their employees: the 'hard core' of wage earners
started to dwindle, while a world of non-status,
temporary, part-time workers proliferated although
the cost fell on the whole of the population and all
firms through increased taxes.
Second, and more interesting, was a search for new
sources of productivity. Through the technological
revolution and the replacement of Taylorist principles,
new norms for the organisation of labour began to be
groped for as the basis for a future regime of
accumulation. As the spectacular leap in Japanese
productivity shows, it is not a question of 'catching up'
or imitating a pre-existing model. Japanese capitalism
overtook that of the USA by inventing a new, post-
Fordist, method of transforming the manual and
intellectual producers' ingenuity into productivity.
But these seeds of the future could only grow in a
favourable macroeconomic and social environment,
which the monetarist shock did not provide.
A Needless Catastrophe: the monetarist shock
When the second oil shock occurred in 1979,
increasing the price per barrel to $34, the vexing issue
of oil rent was brutally reintroduced. A return to 1974
policies was inhibited by a growing scepticism among
the world's élites towards Fordism. Certainly
objective constraints also modified the picture: trade
deficits in France and the UK, accumulated public
debt in the USA and an international centralisation of
capital all reinforced the complementarity of these
economies, limiting the scope for autonomous
Keynesian policies at the national level. More
fundamentally, the inherent shortcomings of this
regime were now evident to world élites. The security
net of monopolistic regulation constrained the
redirection of production and consumption towards
new norms by the rigidity it conferred on the labour
force and on the allocation of capital between sectors.
Internationally, American currency was more and
more questioned and continued to lose its international
purchasing power.
The accession to hegemony of monetarist or simply
less Keynesian coalitions, beginning with the victory
of the Conservatives in Britain, and the nomination of
Volker to the Federal Reserve Board in the USA,
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reflected this avowal of impotence. By the simple
effect of the vacuum, the ideas of liberalism reimposed
themselves: the simple play of market forces would
favour those firms implementing the processes of the
future, eliminate the slag of the past and reconstitute
the harmony of economic behaviours. By 1980, the
change was quite clear: West Germany and France
imposed on their wage earners a downward
adjustment to the oil shock, decreasing industrial
production by five per cent. Only Japan experienced a
growth of 10 per cent, on wages permitted by its
protectionism and the efficiency of its exporting
sector. But even its growth would be broken by the
third shock: the monetarist shock.
With the accession of Reagan to the presidency, the
US joined Britain in the extreme monetarist camp.
Cutting welfare spending and blocking the issue of
credit, these two coalitions erased in their respective
countries, within a few months, the growth of the
previous five years. The ensuing chain reaction
condemned all the other countries to abandon their
social democratic management of the crisis - in effect
it set off a chain of 'austerity-internationalisation' -
and it also dried up the creation of international credit
by erasing OPEC surpluses through the world
recession it provoked. Credit became scarce and
costly, world demand was quickly decreased:
periphery Fordism found itself incapable of repaying
its debts-. By contrast to 1974, the real interest rate of
the developing countries fell only slightly in 1979 and
soared to 20 per cent in 1981 and 1982. By the time
American administrators relaxed monetary constraints
in July 1983, in face of the imminence of the
bankruptcy of the NICs and the multiplication of
bankruptcies in the main industrial countries,
especially the USA, it was too late. In August, Mexico
declared a suspension of payments, signalling a
general insolvency, and bringing the world close to a
financial crash. With the rescheduling of the Third
World debt and the crude restoration of the old
Keynesianism domestically through tax cuts and
increased defence spending, a 'boom', largely based on
household consumption, re-established American
industry in one year (1983) to its 1979 level. The
gigantic budget deficit was largely financed by the
Federal Reserve while the considerable external deficit
which resulted broke the recession in the OECD
countries. But the effects of the monetarist shock were
far from overcome: the NICs were unable to repay
their debts, while the overvaluation of the dollar,
based on American power as it was at the end of the
1960s, is liable to experience a new downfall like that
of 1971. The recovery was a return to the l970s, and
extensive rationalisation in traditional industries did
not clearly signal the possibility of a new growth
period based on new technologies.
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In Conclusion: two plausible resolutions of the
crisis
While no global virtuous circle has yet emerged, we
must reflect on the real effects of the 'electronics
revolution', and understand the social relations which
link technology to a model of development.
Specifically, 'informatics' accomplish two major
innovations. First, the possibility of the full-time use
of machines: second, flexibility in these machine
systems. The automated management of the workshop
permits a leap forward in the fluidity of the production
process, while the robotised workshop can adapt itself
to a fluctuating demand, jumping from short
production series to short production series by means
of rapid reprogramming. Two pairs of options, or
alternative lines of development, present themselves.
First, two possible lines of evolution present
themselves in the post-Fordist reorganisation of the
labour process. The automation of the management of
the production process offers the temptation of
pushing further the break between the theoretical
conception of the process, and its implementation by
the workforce, who become a mere flesh-and-blood
element in the otherwise automated process. This is
the road chosen by the majority of US firms and some
European ones. By contrast, Japanese firms and
certain European ones, have sought to mobilise the
practical know-how of operators in real time in the
actual automation process. This 'crossroads' is the
scene of a tremendous social conflict, in which what is
at stake is the negotiation of a new social compromise
concerning the involvement of the workers and the
apportionment of the new productivity gains.
The second pair of options is presented by the question
of who will be served by these productivity gains.
Despite its initial costs, the flexibility of the automated
workshop makes possible the profitability of large
investments through a succession of short production
runs tailored for a well-off clientele. Without an
increase in mass consumption, these productivity
gains will bring about the growth of unemployment
and the risk of a division of society into three parts: a
dominant class benefiting from the new gadgets of the
electronics revolution, a stable but limited core of
permanent wage-earners, and a growing mass of
insecure workers under a weakened social security
system, gaining transitory employment in the tertiary
sector during short-term recoveries. Such seems to be
the road being followed in the USA. The other road
consists of a new apportionment of productivity gains
through a massive reduction of working time,
allowing mass access to new consumption goods
requiring consumption time. Such a model may not be
competitive in terms of hourly wage costs relative to a
model grounded on the intensification of labour
without any reapportionment of productivity gains.
Again, two roads are open. One is an unending
struggle for hegemony or trade balance equilibrium
through competitive stagnation, producing permanent
trade war and stop and go cycles to the drum-beat of
the hegemonic power. Alternatively, international
institutional forms will be established, permitting in
optimal circumstances, the joint adoption by the
interested parties of a variant of the second model (i.e.,
agreements on international norms concerning
working hours, etc.).
Concretely, the way in which the Third World's
indebtedness is resolved will offer decisive pointers to
the future. Jack London's prophecies in the Iron Heel
have come close to being illustrated at the level of
international relations: the IMF has imposed an
'adjustment' of the NICs' regime of accumulation
towards greater exports, in fact an 'austerity'
programme deepening the divisions and poverty of the
countries of the South, maintaining them in the role of
a sweatshop committed to the production of popular
intermediary or Fordist goods.
The other alternative implies the de facto cancellation
of Third World debt, whether by 'balancing it out' or
by 'consolidating' it. The free issue and distribution of
international currency would then permit the recovery
of the periphery Fordist countries under a more
autonomous, auto-centred regime of accumulation.
Thus, without even mentioning a non-capitalist (or
apocalyptic) resolution of the crisis, two roads are
open, for each question: a repressive way of a new
type, or a social-democratic way of a new type. Is it
necessary to recall that during the 1930s, Nazism and
the New Deal also offered two solutions to the crisis?
And that it took strikes, revolts, a war, and
tremendous social upheavals on the planet for a
variant of the second way to be established?
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